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ESSAY
Extending Comparative Fault to
Apparent and Implied Consent Cases
Aaron D. Twerski† & Nina Farber††
The move away from all-or-nothing responsibility in the
law of torts has been remarkable. It began with the rejection of
contributory fault as a complete bar to negligence and the
substitution of comparative fault in its place,1 but comparative
fault now apportions responsibility whether an action is brought
in negligence,2 strict products liability,3 nuisance,4
misrepresentation,5 or express warranty.6 In large part, it has
swallowed not only issues of fault, but also those of proximate
cause7 and intervening cause.8 Moreover, in many jurisdictions,
proportional recovery now governs such cause-in-fact issues as
lost chance in medical malpractice9 and market share
† Aaron D. Twerski, Irwin and Jill Cohen Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
†† Nina Farber, Assistant Professor of Legal Writing, Brooklyn Law School.
The authors acknowledge the comments of Professors Anita Bernstein, Douglas Kysar, and
Kenneth Simons as well as the members of the Brooklyn Law School Faculty Brown Bag
Series to this essay.
1 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1 (AM.
LAW INST. 2000) [hereinafter APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT]; DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T.
HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON TORTS § 16.3 (2d ed. 2016). To date forty-
six jurisdictions have rejected contributory fault as a complete bar. See AARON D.
TWERSKI, JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & W. BRADLEY WENDEL, TORTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 488–89 (3d ed. 2012).
2 APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 1; DOBBS ET AL., supra note
1, § 16.3; TWERSKI, HENDERSON&WENDEL, supra note 1, at 488–89.
3 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-406 (2016); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411 (McKinney 2016);
Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Cal. 1978); see David G. Owen, Products
Liability: User Misconduct Defenses, 52 S.C. L. REV. 1, 78 (2000).
4 See, e.g., Tint v. Sanborn, 259 Cal. Rptr. 902, 903–05 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
5 Although, in general, comparative fault is not a defense to an intentional
misrepresentation claim, it may be asserted in cases based on negligent misrepresentation.
Gilchrist Timber Co. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 696 So. 2d 334, 339 (Fla. 1997).
6 See Owen, supra note 3, at 67–68.
7 See e.g., Archambault v. Soneco/Northeastern, Inc., 946 A.2d 839, 855–56
(Conn. 2008).
8 See, e.g., Barry v. Quality Steel Prods., Inc., 820 A.2d 258, 269 (Conn. 2003);
Control Techniques, Inc. v. Johnson, 762 N.E.2d 104, 107–08 (Ind. 2002).
9 See TWERSKI, HENDERSON & WENDEL, supra note 1, at 247–54. The leading
case advocating apportioning damages in lost-chance medical malpractice cases is
Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983).
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liability.10 Even the once-universal rule that contributory fault is
not a defense to an intentional tort has given way to
comparative fault in some jurisdictions.11
The majority of jurisdictions adhere to the view that
comparative fault should not apply to intentional torts despite12
significant debate as to the legitimacy of the underlying
rationales for continuing to do so.13 This essay does not enter into
the debate as to whether courts should retain the all-or-nothing
paradigm for all intentional torts. Rather, the authors here
suggest that there are certain cases where “lack of consent” is at
issue in determining liability for an intentional tort that justify
applying comparative responsibility principles in determining
whether a plaintiff has either consented to the invasion of her
person or not. Specifically, in cases where consent is predicated
on apparent consent or implied consent, the all-or-nothing
approach fails to take into account that both plaintiff and
defendant may have been responsible for a miscommunication
as to consent—or lack thereof. This essay focuses on well-known
cases and situations where both parties likely contributed to a
misunderstanding as to whether the plaintiff consented to the
defendant’s conduct. When the court finds that both parties
contributed to the misunderstanding it should apply comparative
fault to reflect that reality.14
10 The leading case is Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
11 See APPORTIONMENTRESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 1 cmt. c, reporter’s notes.
12 Id. at 14–16.
13 See, e.g., Jake Dear & Steven E. Zipperstein, Comparative Fault and
Intentional Torts: Doctrinal Barriers and Policy Considerations, 24 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1 (1984) (arguing that comparative fault should not apply to self-help intentional
torts); William J. McNichols, Should Comparative Responsibility Ever Apply to
Intentional Torts?, 37 OKLA. L. REV. 641 (1984) (suggesting that in some intentional
tort cases comparative fault should be adopted).
14 The question of whether and when courts should opt for scalar or binary
approaches to resolve issues of tort and/or criminal liability has been the subject of
considerable scholarship. See, e.g., Adam J. Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws, 102
CALIF. L. REV. 655 (2014); Adam J. Kolber, The Bumpiness of Criminal Law, 67 ALA. L.
REV. 855 (2016). Scholars have also examined whether scalar liability should be used to
resolve issues of consent. See LEO KATZ, WHY THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE 163–72 (2011);
Kenneth W. Simons, Consent and Assumption of Risk in Tort and Criminal Law, in
UNRAVELING TORT AND CRIME 330 (Matthew Dyson ed., 2014); Larry Alexander, Scalar
Properties, Binary Judgments, 25 J. APPLIED PHIL. 85, 94–97 (2008); Tom W. Bell,
Graduated Consent in Contract and Tort Law: Toward a Theory of Justification, 61
CASE W. RESERVE L. REV. 17 (2010). No writer, however, has yet confronted the use of
comparative fault to resolve problems arising from inadequate or mistaken
communication that is the fault of both the plaintiff and the defendant.
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I. CONSENT TO INTENTIONAL TORTS
It is hornbook law that consent negates liability for
intentional torts.15 Either actual or apparent consent operates as
a bar to recovery for what would otherwise constitute an
actionable intentional tort claim.16 The doctrine of apparent
consent bars recovery entirely where the plaintiff, by word or
deed, leads the defendant to reasonably believe that the plaintiff
consented to the conduct even though she was not actually
willing to permit the invasion to her person or property.17 The
key issue in apparent consent cases is whether a reasonable
person would have interpreted the plaintiff ’s conduct (verbal and
non-verbal) as a signal to proceed with conduct that would
otherwise be tortious. But, therein lies the problem. In
determining whether a hypothetical reasonable person would
have understood the signal as sufficient, courts faced with having
to make an all-or-nothing decision generally focus only on one
side of the equation in examining the plaintiff ’s verbal or
physical cues. In such cases, a court’s focus is either exclusively on
whether the plaintiff sufficiently signaled her consent or,
alternatively, on whether the defendant’s apprehension of consent
was reasonable. Either analysis misses an important dimension,
namely the role of both parties in causing a possible
miscommunication. The sufficiency of consent requires an
understanding of the adequacy of the communication between
both the plaintiff and the defendant, as there is a significant
chance both parties may have been partially at fault in fostering
the misunderstanding. In some cases, parties do not understand
each other because of inadequate signaling by both parties.18 In
others, either party could easily have clarified the terms of the
engagement.19 In still others, the parties may have been involved
in strategic behavior leaving the courts at sea as to how to
interpret the facts.20
Miscommunication and misunderstanding are endemic to
human conversation and human interaction, and parties to a
communication often operate under a flawed perception as to the
signals they project. Social psychologist Dr. Heidi Grant
Halvorson offers the example of a participant in a team business
meeting who intentionally puts on what he defines as his “active
15 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 1, § 8.1.
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
17 Id. §§ 892, 892A.
18 See infra notes 25–29 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 40–46 and accompanying text.
20 See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
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listening face” to communicate he values another participant’s
input and then later learns the entire team thinks he is angry
with them.21 Indeed, differing cultural and societal norms play
a significant role in communication. One example is the
American employee who responds to his British boss’s invitation
to an early lunch with “Yeah, that would be great,” which in
turn leads the boss—who perceives “yeah” instead of “yes” as a
sign of rudeness—to respond: “With that kind of attitude, you
may as well forget about lunch.”22 These cultural and societal
norms may also play a role in an individual’s decision to consent.
Take for example the Japanese businessman, intending to
politely convey that he does not want to agree to a sale, states,
“That will be very difficult” to a Norwegian client, who interprets
the response as indicating “there are still unresolved problems,
not that the deal is off.”23 Likewise, it would be reasonable to
expect that differences in socio-economic status, race, and gender
may lead to misunderstandings between the parties.24 When
the issue of consent arises in litigation, the law may demand
differing levels of clarity in the communication depending on how
it values the underlying activity. Yet parties may be operating
under differing perceptions as to the value of the activity and
their perceptions may be relevant in assessing the degree of
responsibility for the existence of apparent or implied consent.25
With the increased use of proportional recovery
throughout the law of torts, it is time to examine whether the all-
or-nothing paradigm should govern consent cases or whether
many cases would be better decided by asking the trier of fact to
decide what proportion of the fault for miscommunication should
be relegated to each party. This essay will proceed by examining
several classic textbook cases, familiar to most students who have
21 HEIDI GRANT HALVORSON, NO ONE UNDERSTANDS YOU AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 69 (2015); see Emily Esfahani Smith, Mixed Signals: Why People
Misunderstand Each Other, THE ATL. (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/
health/archive/2015/04/mixed-signals-why-people-misunderstand-each-other/391053/
[https://perma.cc/VBP5-RCXC]; see also Boaz Keysar & Anne S. Henly, Speakers’
Overestimation of Their Effectiveness, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 207 (2002) (Speakers
“underestimate the ambiguity of their own utterances . . . . Such overestimation [of their
effectiveness] could be a systematic source of miscommunication in natural conversation.”).
22 NANCY J. ADLER, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR
66–70 (2d ed. 1991) (examining communication across cultural barriers).
23 Id. at 66.
24 Ann C. Shalleck, Feminist Legal Theory and the Reading of O’Brien v.
Cunard, 57 MO. L. REV. 371, 380–81 (1992).
25 Robert H. Lande, A Law & Economics Perspective on a “Traditional” Torts
Case: Insights for Classroom and Courtroom, 57 MO. L. REV. 399, 428–31, 452 (1992)
(discussing the economic incentives for both plaintiff and defendant); see also Dan M.
Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance-
Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729 (2010) (examining how social norms impact the
perception of consent in cases of acquaintance rape).
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taken torts, and inquire whether they would not have been better
served by subjecting consent to a comparative fault analysis.
We do not suggest that comparative fault is appropriate
in all consent cases. In some cases, in which the violation to
human dignity is extremely high, the law should not allow the
party to act unless the terms of engagement are extremely clear.
Thus, for example, courts have required physicians to provide
explicit information as to the risks of a proposed medical
intervention.26 Similarly, in cases involving violent crime,
particularly sexual assault, only a clear and unambiguous
communication that the plaintiff consented should absolve the
defendant from liability. Indeed, where the issue is whether the
plaintiff consented to sexual relations, precluding comparative
fault is necessary to prevent juries from inferring such consent
from casual relations or applying a heightened standard as to
what a person must do to avoid rape that might be influenced
by gender biases.27 In these cases, the stakes are too high to
permit one to act without clear consent. On the other hand, in
many cases of apparent and implied consent, the invasion to
human dignity is of lesser moment. This essay examines a host
of cases in which the signaling between the parties is likely to
be less formal and there is more likely to be a dispute after-the-
fact as to what the parties agreed. To impose full responsibility
on one party or another is to ignore the reality that the
communication in these situations will be less than optimal
and that both parties are responsible for the ambiguity.28
26 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780–82 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 556–58 (Okla. 1979); see
also MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 71–72 (Mass. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 920 (1985) (warning that drug could cause potentially fatal blood clotting was
inadequate because it did not warn that the drug could cause strokes).
27 Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and Comparative
Fault, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1416, 1460–61 (1999); see infra notes 107–112 and
accompanying text. But see Lori E. Shaw, Title IX, Sexual Assault, and the Issue of
Effective Consent: Blurred Lines—When Should “Yes” Mean “No”?, 91 IND. L.J. 1363
(2016) (suggesting that in light of college binge drinking and the ambiguity of non-
verbal cues in the “hook-up” culture and among college students, there are cases in
which an individual claiming sexual assault may bear some responsibility for sending
the alleged attacker the wrong message). In cases where both parties are intoxicated,
comparative fault might well be appropriate in a civil case alleging rape.
28 The trend in some jurisdictions to merge reasonable assumption of the risk
into comparative responsibility supports the thesis of this essay. What was once an all-
or-nothing defense in these jurisdictions is now viewed in comparative fault terms. See,
e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411 (McKinney 2016); Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 701 (Cal.
1992). For a full list of jurisdictions that merge assumption of risk into comparative
fault either by statute or by judicial decision, see VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ & KATHRYN
KELLY, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 9.04 (5th ed. 2015). Voluntary assumption of risk,
like consent, was grounded in the theory that the plaintiff ’s autonomous decision-
making is an important variable in determining a tortfeasor’s liability. Yet, the extent
of the plaintiff ’s knowledge of the risk, the alternatives available to the plaintiff, and
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II. COMPARATIVE FAULT IN APPARENT CONSENT CASES:
AMBIGUOUS SIGNALING AND FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE
In cases where consent to intentional tort is at issue, the
ambiguity may arise from either the defendant’s or the plaintiff ’s
conduct. The following section examines both sides of that coin
through two age-old tort cases.
A. Defendant’s Responsibility to Clarify Ambiguous
Signaling
The following case, over one hundred years old, is a
classic example of a circumstance where the defendant should
have borne some responsibility for not clarifying whether the
plaintiff consented to the invasion of her person. In O’Brien v.
Cunard Steam-Ship Co., Mary O’Brien, a young Irish immigrant
woman, was traveling in steerage from Ireland to Boston on a
ship owned by the Cunard Steam-Ship Company.29 O’Brien was
vaccinated for smallpox30 and as a result, the vaccine left her
body covered with sores and blisters. She sued Cunard claiming
she did not consent to the vaccination, and it thus constituted a
battery.31 The story behind the vaccination is complicated.
Boston health regulations required ship doctors to vaccinate all
immigrants before they disembarked or quarantine them for
fourteen days.32 After being vaccinated, the women received a
certificate allowing them to leave the ship.33 Some two hundred
women lined up to be vaccinated. O’Brien stood at the end of the
line, showed the doctor her arm, and said that she had already
been vaccinated.34 The doctor looked at the arm and said “there
was no mark, and that she should be vaccinated.”35 O’Brien told
the doctor that the original vaccination left no mark.36 The
the defendant’s duty to inform the plaintiff of the risk, are all legitimate factors to
consider in assessing comparative responsibility. Accordingly, the existence of factors
on both sides of the equation is also an important justification for abandoning the all-
or-nothing approach in assumption of the risk and merging it with comparative fault.
29 28 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1891). O’Brien is featured in JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG,
ANTHONY J. SEBOK&BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS
595 (2d ed. 2008); VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW
132 (2d ed. 1999); VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYNKELLY&DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER,
WADE, AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 97 (13th ed. 2015); TWERSKI,
HENDERSON&WENDEL, supra note 1, at 76.
30 O’Brien, 28 N.E. at 266.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
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doctor replied that he should vaccinate her again.37 She then
“held up her arm” and was vaccinated.38 The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court emphasized that “a large number of
women” were vaccinated that day without “a word of objection,”
all of them indicating “by their conduct that they desired to avail
themselves of the provisions made for their benefit.”39
Accordingly, the court found O’Brien did nothing “to indicate to
the surgeon that she did not wish to obtain a card which would
save her from detention at quarantine, and to be vaccinated, if
necessary, for that purpose.”40
The court reasoned that the doctor’s conduct must be
considered in connection with the surrounding circumstances,
and in doing so, examined solely O’Brien’s conduct: “If the
plaintiff ’s behavior was such as to indicate consent on her part,
he was justified in his act, whatever her unexpressed feelings
may have been. In determining whether she consented, he
could be guided only by her overt acts and the manifestations
of her feelings.”41
The O’Brien case has been analyzed and criticized by a
host of scholars, but none have considered whether the case could
have been best resolved through the use of comparative fault
apportionment.42 It is not necessarily true that the doctor could be
“guided only by her overt acts.”43 The doctor could have asked
O’Brien whether she did or did not want the vaccination; the
court’s conclusion that she “held up her arm to be vaccinated”44
may not have been accurate. Having told the doctor about the
previous vaccination and that it did not leave a scar, she may
have raised her arm for the doctor to look more closely to see
whether he could discern some evidence of a vaccination.45 On
the other hand, there were multiple signs on the ship that
informed passengers that they either had to be vaccinated or be
quarantined.46 While O’Brien claimed not to have understood
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 For an extensive discussion of O’Brien, see Symposium, Five Approaches to
Legal Reasoning in the Classroom: Contrasting Perspectives on O’Brien v. Cunard S.S.
Co., 57 MO. L. REV. 351 (1992).
43 See O’Brien, 28 N.E. at 266.
44 Id.
45 One writer suggests that raising the arm might have been “an act of silent
protest or signal of abject resignation in the face of overwhelming intimidation.”
Richard W. Bourne, Introduction to Five Approaches to Legal Reasoning in the Classroom:
Contrasting Perspectives on O’Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 57 MO. L. REV. 351, 357 (1992).
46 O’Brien, 28 N.E. at 266.
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what those words meant, the doctor saw his role as getting
everyone vaccinated. He probably could not fathom that anyone
would prefer fourteen days of quarantine or a trip back to
Ireland as an alternative to a routine smallpox vaccination.
Given the complexity of the situation and the assembly-
line quality of the delivery of the vaccine, it is not surprising that
communication was less than optimal. The poverty and lack of
sophistication of O’Brien, the importance of the vaccine to Boston
health authorities, and the ambiguity of the signaling all played a
part in the lack of clear communication between the parties.
There was enough fault on all sides to eschew an all-or-nothing
solution to the consent question, which left the plaintiff without
recovery for injuries that arguably resulted from duplicative
vaccinations. A court armed with comparative fault might well
decide to allow a plaintiff partial recovery. Any attempt to
disentangle all of the forces that led to the misunderstanding
between O’Brien and the doctor is certain to fail. Comparative
fault allows for a more just resolution of the issue of consent.
B. Plaintiff ’s Responsibility to Clarify Ambiguous
Signaling: De May v. Roberts
This case, also of ancient vintage, often serves as a bridge
between discussions of consent and informed consent in
casebooks,47 and is yet another example that calls for the
application of comparative fault. In De May v. Roberts,48 the
plaintiff, Mrs. Roberts, was about to go into labor to deliver a
child.49 Her physician, defendant Dr. De May, came to her home
on a stormy night.50 De May’s horse and carriage could not
navigate the barely passable roads, and he prevailed on
Scattergood, a young man with no ties to the medical profession,
to accompany him to carry a lantern and other instruments
necessary for the delivery of a baby.51 Plaintiff ’s husband opened
the door, and the physician said that “[he] had fetched a friend
along to help carry [his] things.”52 The plaintiff went into labor
about an hour after Dr. De May’s arrival.53 During the plaintiff ’s
labor, Scattergood sat with his back to the plaintiff, who was
lying on a nearby couch, and could only hear but not see her. At
47 See TWERSKI, HENDERSON & WENDEL, supra note 1, at 90–105; SCHWARTZ,
KELLY& PARTLETT, supra note 29, at 106–08.
48 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 146–47.
51 Id. at 147.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 148.
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one point, a woman, who was holding the plaintiff still so that
she would not fall off the couch, had to leave the room after
plaintiff inadvertently kicked her while in intense pain.54 The
physician called Scattergood to the rescue, and he held the
expectant mother steady until the woman returned.55
In ruling on the suit against the physician in battery for
allowing a young unmarried man to be privy to the plaintiff ’s
delivery and to hold her while she was in labor, the court’s focus
was solely on the physician’s conduct. The court found that
given the physician’s conduct, the plaintiff was justified in
thinking the young man was a physician or a student.56 The
court reasoned that the plaintiff and her husband “had a right
to presume that a practicing physician would not [on such], an
occasion . . . introduce into the house, a young man in no way,
either by education or otherwise, connected with the medical
profession” and that the physician’s “remark . . . that he had
brought a friend along to help carry his things” was insufficient
to remove their presumption.57
Even if one agrees with the court that the physician could
have made it clearer that Scattergood was not a physician or
medical student, the plaintiff and her husband were not free
from fault. The plaintiff was not in labor when the physician and
young man came on the scene. A stranger whom they had never
seen before was introduced as a “friend” who was brought along
to “help carry things.” They could have asked “who is this man?”
It is at least doubtful that in rural Michigan in 1881 that a
medical entourage arrived to aid in the plaintiff ’s delivery on
this stormy night. Blame for this misunderstanding falls on the
shoulders of both parties; consent need not have been an all-or-
nothing question.
III. AMBIGUOUS SILENCE IN FALSE IMPRISONMENT CASES
The most common of false imprisonment cases are those
involving suspected shoplifters and employee discipline; both
types of cases are rife with the potential for not only
miscommunication but also deliberate silence. These cases reflect
a continuing problem as to whether a suspected shoplifter or an
employee charged with wrongdoing willingly consented to stay
on for questioning or remained because the defendant did not
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 147.
57 Id.
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allow him to leave.58 The repetitive nature of the issue in
litigation deserves attention. Typically, a store manager confronts
the suspected shoplifter or employee and tells the suspect she has
reason to believe he has stolen an item or engaged in some sort of
employee misconduct. And thus, an interesting standoff begins.
In the case of the shoplifter, the manager begins to
question the suspect but does not tell him that he is free to
leave. The suspect remains on for some period of time seeking to
convince the manager that he did not take the merchandise.
The suspect does not ask to leave for fear that the manager will
call the police or otherwise subject him to some legal process in
the future. This alone would not constitute false imprisonment.
If a suspect stays for questioning because he believes it would
be advantageous for him to do so, the fact that a shopkeeper
may take future legal action does not constitute false
imprisonment.59 But if the suspect has good grounds to believe
the shopkeeper will bar him from leaving, then he is imprisoned
within the boundaries of the store.60 The issue then becomes
whether the suspect—who had a strong incentive to stay—
voluntarily chose to do so, or did the shopkeeper coerce him to
stay because of the shopkeeper’s strong incentive to keep the
suspect within the store in order to obtain a confession.
Likewise, where an employee accused of wrongdoing is
summoned to a supervisor’s office for questioning, the court is
faced with a similar quandary. The employee may have remained
simply because he believed it would be better for his professional
future to try to exonerate himself; but, on the other hand, he
may have had a legitimate basis for believing his employer would
have prevented him from leaving.
The courts are then left to make an all-or-nothing decision.
Did the suspect or employee voluntarily consent to stay or did he
remain because he believed he could not leave? No one can know
whether the manager or supervisor would have stopped the
suspect or employee if he had asked to leave. The parties dance
58 The cases are legion. See, e.g., Carter v. Aramark Sports & Entm’t Servs.,
Inc., 835 A.2d 262, 285 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (employee discipline); Grant v. Stop-
N-Go Mkt. of Tex., Inc., 994 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. App. 1999) (shoplifting); Teichmiller v.
Rogers Mem’l Hosp., 597 N.W.2d 773 (Wis. 1999) (employee discipline).
59 See, e.g., Blumenfeld v. Harris, 3 A.D.2d 219, 219 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff’d,
145 N.E.2d 871 (N.Y. 1957) (“Threats to invoke peacefully the processes of the law,
standing alone and unaccompanied by force or any other form of restraint, cannot
result in such a detention as would constitute false imprisonment.”).
60 PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 11 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds.,
5th ed. 1984) (noting that “[t]his gives rise, in borderline cases, to questions of fact,
turning upon the details of the testimony, as to what was reasonably to be understood
and implied from the defendant’s conduct, tone of voice and the like, which seldom can
be reflected fully in an appellate record, and normally are for the jury”).
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around the subject and take polar positions at trial. The
plaintiff says he felt coerced to stay, and the defendant testifies
the plaintiff was free to go and she did nothing to lead the
plaintiff to believe otherwise.
Where the plaintiff did not ask to leave, and the defendant
did not tell him that he was free to go if he so desired, courts are
put in the unenviable position of trying to determine whether the
plaintiff consented to stay. The situation is rife with ambiguity,
and the resultant lack of clarity stems from the reality that
neither party has an incentive to clarify the situation. The
plaintiff wants to leave but, at that same time, believes he needs
to stay to convince the defendant of his innocence. Meanwhile, the
defendant may not want to be charged with wrongfully detaining
the plaintiff, but he nevertheless wants to keep the plaintiff from
leaving so as to establish his guilt. Both prefer the ambiguity
until trial when they stake out their opposing positions. Rather
than force the courts to make an all-or-nothing decision, it would
be far better to recognize that both parties are at fault for the lack
of clarity as to consent, apportion fault to both for the ambiguity,
and assess damages accordingly.
Foley v. Polaroid Corporation61 is an excellent example of
this dynamic. Shea—the director of plaintiff Foley’s division and
Polaroid’s top security officer—called Foley into a room to tell
him that a female employee had accused him of sexual assault.62
Foley countered that the employee had a history of performance
problems; that she was worried about Foley’s possible promotion
to be her supervisor; and that she had threatened she would
prevent him from getting the job.63 Shea told Foley that he
should “come clean” and that Polaroid would prosecute him if
he did not admit to the sexual assault.64 When Foley stood up,
Shea told him to “sit back down” and positioned himself between
Foley and the door.65 Foley said he felt he was “under arrest” and
the “only way to get out of that room would be to have a fight
with Jim Shea.”66 When Foley told Shea that he was sick to his
stomach and wanted to use the restroom, Shea pushed his chair
against the door and said “If you go out of that door the job goes
with you.”67 The court held that the threat to fire an at-will
61 508 N.E.2d 72 (Mass. 1987).
62 Id. at 74.
63 Id. at 75.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
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employee did not amount to false imprisonment.68 Before this
last encounter, Foley did not ask whether he could leave because
he was afraid of a confrontation with Shea.69 On the other hand,
Shea wanted Foley to stay so that he could force Foley to confess.
There clearly was a period where both parties contributed to
Foley’s ambiguous status in the interview room. These situations
where an employee believes he will be fired unless he satisfies the
employer are so inherently coercive that anything short of a
clear statement by the employer that the employee is free to go if
he pleases creates ambiguity, which is best resolved by
comparative fault.
The problem of ambiguous communication between the
parties in false imprisonment cases is not limited to shoplifter and
employee discipline cases. Herbst v. Wuennenberg70 is a prime
example of a case where consent was the central issue, and
comparative fault would have better served the parties. And yet,
the court dodged the issue by instead focusing on whether the
plaintiffs should have tested the barriers of their confinement,
precipitating a new line of case law as to when failure to test such
barriers defeats a claim of false imprisonment.71
68 Id. at 77. This result is consistent with the shoplifter cases, in which fear of
arrest is not sufficient to establish imprisonment. See supra note 58 and accompanying
text. Indeed, the Restatement takes the position that threat of loss of employment is
not sufficient to void consent, as do many jurisdictions. See Faniel v. Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., 404 A.2d 147, 152 (D.C. 1979); Columbia Sussex Corp., Inc. v.
Hay, 627 S.W.2d 270, 277–78 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Foley, 508 N.E.2d at 77–78 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B reporter’s note (AM. LAW INST. 1982)); Moen
v. Las Vegas Int’l Hotel, Inc., 521 P.2d 370, 371 (Nev. 1974). A question arises,
however, whether a court may be simply pinning its holding on this premise in order to
duck the real problem of resolving a situation that necessarily involves some fault on
both sides. See supra notes 59–60.
69 Foley, 508 N.E.2d at 75.
70 266 N.W.2d 391 (Wis. 1978).
71 Courts dodge the issue of consent in several ways. Most states grant a
shopkeeper a privilege to detain a suspected shoplifter for a reasonable amount of time
to investigate a theft if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect was
shoplifting. See Robert A. Brazener, Construction and Effect, In False Imprisonment
Action, of Statute Providing for Detention of Suspected Shoplifters, 47 A.L.R. 3d 998
(1973) (updated weekly). Or a court, looking for some basis to find for the plaintiff, may
hold that the plaintiff is not required to test the barriers (e.g. physical force) to
determine whether she is, in fact, imprisoned because she had no reasonable means of
escape. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 36 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
Indeed, before the almost universal adoption of the shopkeeper’s privilege, it was not
unusual for a court to find that a shoplifter’s fear of loss of personal dignity could be
sufficient to establish confinement. See, e.g., Jacques v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 138
N.E. 843, 844–45 (Mass. 1923) (restaurant patron accused of not paying stated a case
for false imprisonment where “her honesty and veracity had been openly and
repeatedly challenged” in front of other customers, who might have interpreted her
leaving before exoneration as an admission of guilt); see also Lopez v. Wigwam Dep’t
Stores No. 10, Inc., 421 P.2d 289, 294 (Haw. 1966) (sustaining jury verdict of false
imprisonment where shoplifter detained in store office could have “reasonably feared
that any attempt to leave would result in a public demonstration and subsequent
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In Herbst, a group of volunteers sought to purge
ineligible voters from the voter list and were checking names on
the list against the mailboxes in the vestibule in the defendant’s
apartment house.72 The defendant stepped out of his apartment
and challenged their right to check the voter list in the district.73
While he called the police, his wife stationed herself in front of
the outer door of the apartment house, stretching her arm across
the doorway.74 The plaintiffs subsequently sued for false
imprisonment for their detention while the parties were waiting
for the police to arrive. Plaintiffs agreed that no one threatened
them and that they did not ask for permission to leave.75 When
asked why they did not leave, they answered that they would
have had to push the defendant’s wife out of the way to do so.76
The defendant’s wife said that she positioned herself in front of
the outer doorway because she did not want “someone . . . to run
away at that point.”77 Nonetheless, she testified that she would
not have made any effort to stop the plaintiffs had they attempted
to leave because she was “not physically capable of stopping
anybody.”78 After a trial, the jury found for the plaintiffs and
awarded them $1500 in damages.79
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that
defendant’s wife did not create a sufficient barrier by standing in
the doorway.80 “At best, the evidence supports an inference that
[they] remained in the vestibule because they assumed they
would have to push [defendant’s wife] out of the way in order to
leave. This assumption is not sufficient to support a claim for
false imprisonment.”81 The court went on to say that plaintiffs
were merely speculating that they were not free to leave and
that, “[a]t a minimum, . . . plaintiffs should have attempted to
ascertain whether there was any basis to their assumption that
humiliation”); Mahan v. Adam, 124 A. 901 (Md. 1924) (sufficient evidence of false
imprisonment to avoid summary judgment where witness heard shopkeeper accuse the
plaintiff). These cases are in fact inconsistent with the employee cases—how can loss of
livelihood, and possibly a home, be more threatening than a few moments of shame in
front of some onlookers? The only explanation is this is yet another effort (this time in
the plaintiff ’s favor) to avoid addressing the more complex issue of consent.
72 Herbst, 266 N.W.2d at 393.
73 Id. at 394.
74 Id. at 393.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 394.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 396.
81 Id.
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their freedom of movement had been curtailed.”82 The court
never considered the issue of consent, which was really the heart
of the matter.
As in the shoplifter and employee discipline cases
discussed above, the court had to deal with an ambiguous
situation born of competing incentives: the plaintiffs had an
incentive to stay and try to exonerate themselves, while the
defendant also wanted to keep the plaintiffs from leaving in hopes
the police would arrest them. If the only option is to make an all-
or-nothing finding on the issue of consent, perhaps the
Wisconsin court was correct. One of the defendants did block
the door, and the defendants did not tell plaintiffs they were free
to go. On the other hand, plaintiffs did not inquire whether they
would be stopped if they tried to leave. Both parties bear
responsibility for the misunderstanding. Had the court considered
the option of applying comparative fault to this situation, a jury
could have assessed responsibility in a manner that would have
reflected that reality.
IV. BORDERLINE VIOLENCE IN SPORTS INJURY CASES:
APPLYING COMPARATIVE FAULT TO THE ISSUE OF
IMPLIED CONSENT
How to deal with borderline violence in sports cases has
bedeviled the courts.83 No one questions that if one player pulls
out a gun and shoots an opposing team’s player in a fit of rage
that the actor is liable for committing a battery. Nor is their
disagreement that a player injured during the normal course of
a game has no cause of action for battery. Participants in sports
impliedly consent to the normal risks inherent in playing the
game. They need not signal assent to other players; it is well
known that in a contact sport injuries are expected. While league
rules prohibit specific conduct that is prone to serious harm,
violations of these rules generally do not give rise to a cause of
action in tort.84 For example, a football player who injures an
opponent when he pulls on the opponent’s facemask may be
82 Id. at 396–97. A major premise for the result was that, given that the
plaintiffs outnumbered the defendant three-to-one, their assumption was speculative if
not completely unfounded. Id. at 397 (Plaintiffs “outnumbered Wuennenberg three-to-
one; and they gave no testimony to the effect that they were frightened of Wuennenberg
or that they feared she would harm them.”).
83 See, e.g., Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 393–94 (Cal. 2006)
(“beanball” in retaliation for ball thrown at teammate is within the custom of the game and
is within consent); Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 710 (Cal. 1992) (in bank) (discussing
what is consented to in game of touch football).
84 Avila, 131 P.3d at 393–94; Knight, 834 P.2d at 710.
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subject to a penalty by the official, but no civil action in tort will
succeed.85 In the normal course of a football game such conduct
is fully anticipated. It is part of the rough and tumble of the
sport and participants are said to impliedly consent to such
violation of the rules.86
There are, however, cases in which the violent conduct
arguably exceeds the scope of consent. Consider the well-known
case of Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.,87 in which a
player, “Booby Clark,” struck opposing player, Dale Hackbart,
while Hackbart was kneeling on the ground watching a play
unfold up field that resulted in a bad turn of events for Clark’s
team, the Cincinnati Bengals.88 Although Hackbart was not
involved in the play, Clark “acting out of . . . frustration” stepped
forward and struck a blow with his right forearm to the back of
Hackbart’s head causing a serious neck fracture.89 Hackbart
sued the Bengals, but the trial court dismissed the case holding
that as a matter of law, professional football is basically violent
in nature and the available sanctions are imposition of
penalties or expulsion from the game.90 The Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that “[t]he general
customs of football do not approve of intentional punching or
striking of other [players].”91 The court remanded to the trial
court to review the case on its facts.92 In other words, the trial
court should not have dismissed the case based on the blanket
assumption that football was a violent sport but should have
examined the conduct of the players in the specific circumstances
of the case to determine whether players would have consented to
this kind of conduct.93
85 See, e.g., Knight, 834 P.2d at 708 (“[D]efendants generally have no legal
duty to eliminate (or protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself.”).
86 See id.
87 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979).
88 Id. at 519.
89 Id. For football cognoscenti, the following occurred: “Booby Clark,” an
offensive back for the Cincinnati Bengals struck Dale Hackbart, a defense player for
the Denver Broncos, while he was kneeling on the ground. Id. Just before the injury,
Clark had run a pass pattern to the Bronco’s end zone, which a Denver free safety
intercepted, changing the players’ roles. Id. Clark was now playing defense, and
Hackbart, who had been defending the pass, became an offensive player. Id. In this
role, he threw a block at Clark by throwing his body against him and falling to the
ground. Id. Hackbart remained on his knees and watched what was taking place up
field after the interception. Id. Clark “acting out of . . . frustration” stepped forward
and struck a blow with his right forearm to the back of Hackbart’s head causing a
serious neck fracture. Id.
90 Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352, 356 (D. Colo. 1977),
rev’d, 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979).
91 Hackbart, 601 F.2d at 521.
92 Id. at 526–27.
93 Id. at 526.
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Had this case been tried on remand, the court would have
needed to address the scope of the implied consent of players
engaging in a professional football game. On that issue, the
testimony of a witness in the earlier trial, who described how
players were conditioned to maximize their violent instincts
against opposing players, would have been relevant. The witness,
a well-known football coach, stated that in programming players
before a game, coaches seek to generate in the players “an
emotion equivalent to that which would be experienced by a
father whose family had been endangered by another driver
who had attempted to force the family car off the edge of a
mountain road.”94 The coach said that “[t]he precise pitch of
motivation for the players . . . should be the feeling of that
father when . . . he is about to open the door to take revenge
upon the person of the other driver.”95
If asked, Hackbart would have explicitly stated that he
did not impliedly consent to being hit on his neck from behind
when he was no longer in the play. But that is not the question.
Rather, since both Hackbart and Clark had been the subject of
pre-game programming, did they impliedly consent to play in a
sport in which violent anger is the norm? Can we expect such
violent emotions to be turned off in a matter of seconds? The
contours of implied consent in any context are vague. The
sports injury cases, however, make particularly clear that such
consent is not easily determined by an all-or-nothing approach.
It would be far better to apply comparative fault to apportion
the damages arising out of this injury. The athletes in
Hackbart both indulged in an activity knowing there was a
wide margin of acceptable conduct. Accordingly, they knew the
scope of their consent would be murky at best. Bench-clearing
brawls, with combatants throwing punches at each other
following a controversial play, are all too common. How much
contact is consented to? The lack of clarity is the fault of all who
partake in the game. Courts should not be asked to make all-or-
nothing findings. Apportionment, using the principles of
comparative responsibility, will produce a more fair and realistic
result. Thus, whether Clark acted within two seconds of the
tackle or ten seconds is relevant in determining the amount of
responsibility we wish to place on Clark.
94 Hackbart, 435 F. Supp. at 355.
95 Id. The testimony was that of the Denver Bronco’s coach, John Ralston. Id.
Paul Brown, another famous coach, testified that aggressiveness was the primary
attribute sought in the selection of players. Id. at 355–56.
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In short, some violence is clearly within the realities of the
sport even when players violate the rules of the game. At the
other extreme, some violent conduct is clearly beyond the pale
and warrants a finding of battery. There is, however, an ill-
defined area where comparative fault would provide a more
accurate remedy rather than the classic binary consent or no
consent models.
V. THEDUAL INTENT RULE AND CONSENT IN BATTERY
CASES
The character of the intent necessary to make out an
intentional battery has been the subject of considerable
controversy. Is intent to cause a contact alone sufficient? Namely,
is it enough that the defendant intends (or knows to a substantial
certainty) that a contact will occur, or must the defendant also
intend (or know to a substantial certainty) to cause the
consequences of his act (“the dual-intent rule”)? The black letter of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts adopts the second approach,
providing that an actor is liable for an intentional tort only if she
acts with either the desire to cause the consequences of her act,
or with the belief that the consequences are substantially certain
to result from it.96 Accordingly, in states that adopt the Second
Restatement, the prima facie case for battery requires not only an
intentional contact which is offensive or causes bodily harm but
also the desire or knowledge to a substantial certainty that the
conduct be harmful or offensive.97 The Third Restatement rejects
the dual-intent requirement and finds it sufficient if the
defendant intended the contact and the contact is either offensive
to a reasonable person or causes bodily harm.98
Whether the Second Restatement or Third Restatement
position is preferable is beyond the scope of this essay, but it is
worth noting that application of comparative fault would resolve
an incongruity in applying the defense of apparent consent in
jurisdictions where dual intent is necessary to prove a battery.
The reporters for the Third Restatement illustrate the problem:
96 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
97 Id. § 13. But see Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in Tort of Battery:
Confusion and Controversy, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1585 (2012) (arguing that the Second
Restatement is ambiguous as to whether dual intent is required or whether single
intent to contact is sufficient).
98 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 101
(AM. LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015).
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Actor honestly but unreasonably believes that plaintiff consents[.]
In one category of offensive-battery cases, an actor honestly but
unreasonably believes that plaintiff consents to the contact in
question, and the plaintiff if offended by the contact. . . .
The tension arises as follows. The apparent-consent doctrine
provides a defense for actors who honestly and reasonably (though
mistakenly) believe that the other has consented to a contact. By
contrast, actors who honestly and unreasonably believe that the
other has consented are still liable. But if a jurisdiction endorses the
dual-intent rule, this restriction of the apparent-consent doctrine to
only those actors who hold a reasonable belief that the other
consents makes little sense, and seems largely gratuitous. Under
dual intent, the actor must have the purpose to offend or must know
that he will offend the other. But how could an actor know that he
will offend the other if he honestly (albeit unreasonably) believes
that the other consents? In short, the apparent-consent doctrine
states that if an actor X unreasonably and honestly believes that Y
consents, X is liable; while the dual-intent rule says (in offensive-
battery cases) that if X unreasonably and honestly believes that Y
consents, X is not liable. It is thus difficult to endorse both the
apparent-consent doctrine and the dual-intent view.99
According to the reporters, the difficulty with the dual-intent
view arises when an actor honestly but unreasonably believes
that another is willing for the contact to occur. Such an actor
does not intend an offensive contact.
Although, in some cases, a defendant’s unreasonable
belief may result from self-delusion,100 in most instances it arises
from the plaintiff ’s ambiguous signaling. In these instances,
both parties bear some responsibility for the mistaken consent.
When such a situation arises, there is good reason to abandon
the all-or-nothing rule in consent cases. Thus a defendant who
acts with an unreasonable belief that plaintiff consented should
be liable, at least in part, not because single intent to contact is
sufficient but because he acted both intentionally and
unreasonably.
VI. SEXUALDURESS CASES: COMPARATIVE FAULT GONE
AWRY
Interestingly, the only case the authors found that applies
comparative fault in a consent setting is one whose application is
99 Id. § 102 cmt. b. 2, illus. 6.
100 For example, a movie star, upon meeting a group of fans, kisses one on the cheek,
thinking that all female fans would want to be kissed by him. This self-delusion, although
perhaps understandable, is unreasonable. For other examples, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: INTENTIONALTORTSTOPERSONS, supra note 98, § 102 cmt. b., illus. 10, 11.
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clearly wrong. In Grager v. Schudar,101 plaintiff Grager, a female
inmate in a North Dakota county jail sued defendant, jailer
Schudar, claiming that he had sexually assaulted her when she
was a prisoner.102 In a previous criminal action, Schudar had
pled guilty to a criminal charge of sexual abuse of a ward under
a North Dakota statute that proscribes a jailer’s sexual act with
a prisoner regardless of the prisoner’s consent.103 The question
before the court was whether, in the civil case, the lower court
had properly instructed the jury that consent was a complete
defense to the battery, notwithstanding the criminal statute
imposing criminal liability regardless of the prisoner’s consent.104
In most jurisdictions, the general rule is that a defendant
may assert the defense of consent even if that defendant’s
conduct violated a criminal statute.105 Notwithstanding this rule,
consent does not operate as a defense when a criminal statute is
designed to protect a class of persons from abuse of power and
duress.106 The North Dakota appellate court recognized that its
criminal statute prohibiting sexual relations between a guard
and a prisoner fell within this exception to the general rule.107
Thus, it overruled the lower court’s ruling that the prisoner’s
consent was a complete bar to her claim of battery.108 On the
other hand, it determined that the exception had to be reconciled
with North Dakota’s comparative fault statute, which the court
found had adopted a system of modified comparative fault
applicable to a broad array of causes of action, including the
prisoner’s claim of battery.109 Thus, although the prisoner’s
consent did not bar her claim, the jury had to consider it in
apportioning fault. The court directed that on remand the jury,
when deciding whether the prisoner had “effectively consented
to the sexual act,” should be instructed to “consider all of the
factors limiting . . . [her] ability to control the situation or to
give consent,” including “age, sex, mental capacity, and relative
101 770 N.W.2d 692 (N.D. 2009).
102 Id. at 693–94.
103 Id. at 694.
104 Id. at 695.
105 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 1, § 8.13 (noting that some courts disagree
as to whether violation of a criminal statute bars a defendant from asserting the
defense of consent).
106 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892C (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
107 Grager, 770 N.W.2d at 697. The North Dakota Statute, N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-20-06 (2016), criminalizes a jailer’s sexual act with a prisoner regardless of whether
the prisoner consents to the act and, accordingly, fits squarely within § 892C of the Second
Restatement of Torts.
108 Grager, 770 N.W.2d at 699.
109 Id. at 697–98 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-01 (2016)).
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positions of the parties.”110 In effect, such instructions ask the
jury to consider whether the prisoner’s consent was truly the
product of duress or whether she could have exercised some
control to prevent the assault. Under such instructions, a jury
could find the guard eighty percent at fault and the plaintiff
twenty percent at fault. The authors fail to understand how
duress can be equated with fault and thus do not understand
how it can be apportioned. Fault speaks to culpability and
wrongdoing; duress addresses autonomous decision-making and
willingness. One can readily compare relative degrees of
culpability but how can one be twenty percent willing? Unlike the
cases outlined in this essay where both parties bear some degree
of fault for miscommunicating, Granger is not about
communication. The plaintiff may well have communicated her
willingness to engage in sexual relations with the guard, but if
she consented because of abuse of power, she should be entitled
to recover.
With rare exception, courts have held that fault should
never be assigned to a rape victim in a civil case against the
rapist.111 Professor Ellen Bublick argues not only that courts
should refuse to consider a rape victim’s fault in actions against
a rapist but also in cases brought against third parties whom the
plaintiff alleges had a duty to prevent the rape from occurring.112
She makes a strong argument that allowing courts to consider a
rape victim’s fault imposes on women an unreasonable duty to
assume that every encounter involves a possible rape and to
take every measure to shape their conduct around the fear of
possible rape.113 According to Professor Bublick, one danger of
such a fault assessment is that juries will inappropriately
incorporate gender biases into determining whether a reasonable
woman would have taken action to prevent a rape.114 For
example, Bublick points to the incongruity of a case in which
there “was no suggestion that a straight white man was negligent
for his [own] rape because he was out alone in a nightclub parking
lot,”115 with another case where the jury found a female rape
victim thirty percent negligent for not avoiding “certain streets
110 Id. at 698.
111 One case allowing the imposition of fault against the victim of rape has
been overruled by statute. See Morris v. Yogi Bear’s Jellystone Park Camp Resort, 539
So. 2d 70, 77–78 (La. Ct. App. 1989), superseded by statute, LA. CIV. CODE, ANN. art.
2323 (1996).
112 Bublick, supra note 27, at 1416.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1460–61.
115 Id. at 1460 (citing Peterson v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan, 711 So. 2d 703, 714
(La. Ct. App. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 733 So. 2d 1198 (La. 1999)).
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[that] ‘were dangerous places for a young lady . . . at 3:00 o’clock
in the morning.’”116 Courts ought to recognize a “no duty” rule
that protects women from such fault assessment.117
CONCLUSION
The reluctance of some courts to allow comparative fault
as a defense to intentional torts118 bears little relevance to the
thesis that in cases of mistaken communication the fault of both
parties should be considered. In the classic intentional tort case,
the conduct of the defendant is clearly outside the realm of
acceptable social conduct. In cases of mistaken communication,
the heart of the issue is the possible violation of social norms.
Indeed, even with regard to classic intentional torts, scholars
have advocated for comparative fault for the violation of legal
norms that involve “low-level moral culpability”119 or conduct
that is more akin to negligence.120 It is not unusual for courts to
re-couch an intentional tort in terms of negligence where doing
so fosters important policy goals. For example, in informed
consent medical malpractice cases, courts have almost
unanimously couched the tort in terms of negligence, even though
the issue in such cases is whether the physician has withheld
information on risks attendant to the medical intervention that
would vitiate the patient’s consent, making the medical
procedure a battery.121 Re-casting the tort in negligence avoids
116 Id. (quoting Zerangue v. Delta Towers, Ltd., 820 F.2d 130, 132 (5th Cir. 1987)).
117 Id. at 1441. Professor Bublick is critical of the Restatement’s position with
regard to the use of comparative fault to reduce damages against an intentional
tortfeasor. Id. at 1430 n.98. The Restatement takes no position as to whether plaintiff ’s
conduct should be compared with that of an intentional tortfeasor. APPORTIONMENT
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 17. Even if courts were to allow the reduction of damages
in intentional tort cases based on comparative fault, they need not do so in rape cases.
There is a vast difference between reducing damages for a plaintiff who is so enraged
by the defendant’s obnoxious conduct that he then batters him, and reducing damages
because plaintiff ’s conduct supposedly encouraged the defendant to rape the plaintiff.
Professor Bublick’s argument that the law ought to adopt a rule that allows a woman
to shape her life free from the fear of rape is persuasive. However, what constitutes
consent in “acquaintance rape” cases has been a matter of huge controversy. See, e.g.,
Note, Acquaintance Rape and Degrees of Consent: “No” Means “No,” But What Does
“Yes” Mean?, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2341 (2004). Some cases of acquaintance rape set forth
in the article might well call for the application of comparative fault principles.
118 See cases cited in APPORTIONMENT RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 1 cmt. b.
For a review of the case law pro and con, see Bonpua v. Fagan, 602 A.2d 287 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1992). See also Allan L. Schwartz, Applicability of Comparative Negligence
Principles to Intentional Torts, 18 A.L.R. 525 (5th ed. 1994).
119 McNichols, supra note 13, at 685.
120 Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 13, at 2 (“[N]egligence, recklessness, and
intentional conduct are . . . not different in kind, but . . . reflect degrees of violation” of
social norms.).
121 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 1, at 654; Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen,
Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988
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liability for doctors in cases where the plaintiff would have agreed
to the procedure even if she were properly informed.122
The cases outlined in this essay are, in truth, instances of
negligent failure to adequately communicate.123 Even in the cases
dealing with sports injuries where players have seriously violated
the rules of the game, it is often hard to assign serious moral
blame to the violator. In this past year, a runner viciously slid
into second base to avoid a double play and seriously injured
another baseball player,124 and a football player intentionally
butted helmets after the official terminated the play, conduct
that was extremely dangerous.125 The emotions generated in the
U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 609–13 (1988); see cases cited supra note 26 and accompanying text.
Courts are reluctant to label informed consent cases as batteries. To do so would hold
physicians liable without having to prove damages. The violation of the dignitary right
is sufficient to make out a battery; damages need not be proven. See DOBBS ET AL.,
supra note 1, § 4.20.
122 Unlike intentional tort claims, which are dignitary torts and require no
proof that the defendant’s actions harmed the plaintiff, in a negligence action the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant’s conduct was a but-for cause of the harm. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). By re-casting informed consent cases as a
negligence claim, a plaintiff who would have undergone a procedure, even if fully
informed, cannot recover. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 1, § 311. If courts treated
informed consent cases as a traditional battery, a claim could be made out whenever the
plaintiff ’s body is invaded by an unconsented touching. Id.
123 Professor Anita Bernstein has suggested to the authors that comparative
responsibility principles might be used to allocate fault in express assumption of the
risk cases. Many of these cases contain exculpatory clauses absolving the defendant
from claims of negligence. These are classic contracts of adhesion. Plaintiffs rarely read
or understand what they have waived, and defendants do little or nothing to make
them aware that they are signing away valuable rights. Whether such clauses should
be given any effect is a matter of serious debate. See, e.g., Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters.,
LLC., 1 A.3d 678, 681–703 (N.J. 2010). In that case, the plaintiff was seriously injured
when the handles of an exercise bicycle dislodged and caused her to fall to the ground.
Id. at 681. Plaintiff alleged multiple counts of negligence against the gym but a sharply
split Supreme Court dismissed the case because the plaintiff had signed a waiver when
she became a member of the gym, thereby releasing the gym from all claims of
negligence. Id. at 682–84, 695. Given the nature of the contract, it seems that both
parties may have been at fault with regard to the agreement. Plaintiff should have read
more carefully before signing away her rights and defendant should have explicitly alerted
the plaintiff to the ramifications of the waiver. Whether claims of unconscionability should
be subject to comparative fault raise issues beyond the scope of this essay.
124 Chase Utley of the Los Angeles Dodgers “was suspended for Games 3 and
4” of the playoffs “for his takeout slide that broke the leg of [New York] Mets shortstop
Rubin Tejada” in the 2015 National League Divisions Series. Ken Gurnick, Utley to
Appeal 2-Game Suspension for Slide, MLB (Oct. 12, 2015), http://m.mlb.com/news/article/
154097810/dodgers-chase-utley-suspended-for-slide/ [https://perma.cc/N29T-CSMB]. The
Los Angeles Dodgers stated that they stood “behind Chase Utley and his decision to
appeal [his] suspension.” Id.
125 Odell Beckham, Jr., a receiver for the New York Giants was suspended for
one game because of his conduct in the December 20, 2015 game against the Carolina
Panthers. See Ohm Youngmisuk & David Newton, Josh Norman: Odell Beckham Jr.
Should Have Been Tossed, ESPN (Dec. 21, 2015), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/14408
956/josh-norman-carolina-panthers-rips-odell-beckham-jr-says-new-york-giants-receiver-
field [https://perma.cc/5H8S-YQKV]. On one occasion in that game, he rushed across the
field to deliver a helmet-to-helmet blow to Josh Norman, a Panther’s cornerback. See
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sports arena are intense and not easily turned off in two or three
seconds. In these cases, where the question is the scope of
implied consent, all participants bear some responsibility for
the vagueness of the line drawn between acceptable and non-
acceptable violence.126 Players’ unions could advocate for clearer
definitions and the imposition of serious sanctions when players
cross a line. What happens is the very opposite. When the league
imposes serious penalties, the team management or the unions
contest them as unfair to the players and the teams they
represent.127 In short, in these vague consent cases, there is
enough fault to go around.
It is unlikely that the imposition of comparative fault will
deter valuable social behavior on the part of those who believe
that they have a right to act based on conduct that reasonably
appears to signal consent. There is little evidence that the shift
id. That conduct of such severity was deserving of only a one-game suspension speaks
volumes as to the kind of conduct that is viewed to be within the limits of consent.
126 A large number of cases find no liability unless the conduct of the
defendant is reckless or wanton under the theory that the participants assume the
risks of ordinary negligence as conduct inherent in the sport. See, e.g., Ross v. Clouser,
637 S.W.2d 11, 13–14 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (holding that the cause of action for injury
sustained during softball game must be predicated on recklessness not negligence);
Dunagan v. Coleman, 427 S.W.3d 552, 558 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that a catcher
injured in softball game can sue the pitcher only for recklessness, not negligence);
Mark v. Moser, 746 N.E.2d 410, 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that an athlete
injured during triathlon can sue only for recklessness). However, administering the
recklessness standard in a contact sport is no easy matter. See Daniel E. Lazaroff,
Torts & Sports: Participant Liability to Co-Participants for Injuries Sustained During
Competition, 7 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 191, 213 (1990). It is not only close to
impossible to draw a line for liability based on the defendant’s recklessness, but doing
so masks the issue of the plaintiff ’s role in consenting to the co-participant’s conduct in
a violent sport and presumes plaintiffs would never acquiesce to reckless conduct. Yet,
experience teaches that, at least in professional sports, players and their unions
regularly seek to protect players from sanctions for conduct that is reckless or
intentional. The culture of violence in professional football received notoriety on what
came to be known as “Bountygate.” An investigation revealed that members of the New
Orleans Saints received bounties if they injured opposing teams’ star quarterbacks.
The history of this sordid scandal is recounted in Lynn Zinser, Bountygate: A Circular,
Confusing History, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2012), http://fifthdown.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/
10/10/bountygate-a-circular-confusing-history/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/GDQ3-T5NS] (and
accompanying links). It is noteworthy that despite the Saints defensive coach’s admission
to the bounty program, the head of the National Football League Players Association
went on national television and denied that the Saints bounty program ever existed.
Chris Strauss, NFLPA Head: Saints Bounty Program ‘Never Existed’, USA TODAY (Dec.
12, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/story/gameon/2012/12/12/nfl-saints-bounty-smith/176
4161/ [https://perma.cc/4CDD-NEP7].
127 For example, in a recent National Hockey League game between the
Boston Bruins and the Pittsburgh Penguins, a Bruins player struck one of the
Penguins while he was lying defenseless on the ground causing him to be later
hospitalized with a concussion. Gary B. Bettman, Thornton Decision on Appeal, NHL
(Dec. 24, 2014), http://www.nhl.com/nhl/en/v3/ext/pdfs/Thornton_DecisionOnAppeal122
413.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9DB-VNR2]. The NHL suspended the Bruins player for
fifteen games, but the Players’ Association appealed, alleging the fifteen-game suspension
was too harsh. Id.
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from contributory fault as a complete bar to comparative fault
has had an impact on the primary behavior of actors.128 The case
for comparative fault for some apparent and implied consent
cases is addressed to courts in helping them resolve murky
consent cases where competing parties stake out polar positions.
In the majority of cases, the binary all-or-nothing paradigm is
fully justified. But when courts sense that both parties bear
responsibility for the lack of clarity in the communication they
should feel free to allow the factfinder (either judge or jury) to
apportion fault.
128 A significant body of law and economics literature focuses on the efficiency of
comparative negligence. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMICANALYSIS OF LAW 156–67
(3d ed. 1986); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 123–24 (2d ed. 1977); John
Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 347 (1973);
Robert D. Cooter & Thomas S. Ulen, An Economic Case for Comparative Negligence, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067 (1986); David Haddock & Christopher Curran, An Economic Theory of
Comparative Negligence, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 50 (1985). But there is little empirical
work as to whether the change from contributory fault as a complete bar to comparative
negligence has had any impact on primary behavior. One study is inconclusive. See
Michelle J. White, Empirical Comparisons of the Contributory Versus Comparative
Negligence Rule, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (P.
Newman ed., 1998); see also Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of
Evidence on Primary Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. 518, 536–37 (2010).
